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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
Never before in the history of the organized bar has the
legal community been faced with such extensive criticism from
diverse sectors of society. Recent statements by Chief Justice
Burger and President Carter have reinforced the public's lack
of confidence in the bar which resulted in large measure from
the role of attorneys in the Watergate disaster. In his annual
"State of the Judiciary" message to the American Bar Associa-
tion in February, 1977, the Chief Justice estimated that as
many as half of the nation's trial lawyers perform less than
adequately, and suggested that lawyers be specially certified
before allowed to try a case. President Carter, in an even more
direct attack on the legal profession, criticized the high cost of
justice, delays in the judicial system, and the legal profession's
apparent emphasis on serving the privileged few. More re-
cently, similar criticism has been articulated by consumer ad-
vocate Ralph Nader and California Governor Jerry Brown.
The effect of this criticism has been to create a public
impression that all lawyers are greedy and almost exclusively
self-interested. Although the American Bar Association imme-
diately denied most of President Carter's charges at a news
conference held in Washington, D.C., attorneys must engage in
more stringent self-regulation if they hope to upgrade their
tarnished public image.
The Kentucky Supreme Court disciplinary cases for the
1977-1978 term demonstrate the Court's commitment to en-
forcing strictly the rules regulating the professional and non-
professional conduct of attorneys. Indeed, the Court disbarred
five attorneys during the 1977-1978 term, three of them perma-
nently, thereby evidencing the Court's unwillingness to be leni-
ent with offenders whose conduct is likely to bring the bench
and bar into disrepute.
Aside from this increased emphasis on professional integ-
rity, the major development in the law affecting the conduct
of attorneys was the action of the United States and Kentucky
Supreme Courts in eliminating regulation of certain types of
advertising by attorneys. This article will examine the recent
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federal and state cases in both the area of attorney advertising
and the area of misconduct by attorneys, as well as briefly
considering two other, unrelated decisions concerning profes-
sional responsibility.
I. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
Professional solicitation of legal business is undoubtedly
the area of professional conduct which most interests the prac-
ticing bar at the present time. During the past year, both the
United States Supreme Court and the Kentucky Supreme
Court decided cases drastically altering the bar's historic abil-
ity to regulate attorney advertising. As a result of these deci-
sions, attorneys are now permitted, under some conditions, to
advertise legal services.
A. Bates and Ohralik
Prior to the 1977 decision of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,'
the courts had consistently held that legal advertising was
"commercial speech ' 2 outside the protection of the first
amendment and thus subject to regulation by the bar. Grad-
ually the courts began to create exceptions to the "commercial
speech" doctrine and in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc.,3 the doctrine was
reduced to a balancing test to determine the limits of state
regulation.'
Consistent with Virginia Board, the Court in Bates recog-
nized that the constitutional validity of state regulation of at-
torney advertising must be judged by examination and evalua-
tion of the competing interests.' In fact, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority in Bates, termed the decision as one
flowing "a fortiori" from the decision in Virginia Board.,
Applying the Virginia Board balancing test, the Court found
1 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 The "commercial speech" doctrine refers to commercial advertising which was
determined to be outside the protection of the first amendment. Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
3 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 764-65.
433 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 365.
[Vol. 67
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
that a blanket prohibition on attorney advertising was imper-
missible, since the consumer interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information outweighed the state's interest in prevent-
ing commercial fraud which was presumably served by the
ban.7
In Bates, John R. Bates and Van O'Steen, two licensed,
practicing attorneys in Arizona, ran an advertisement in a
Phoenix daily newspaper listing specific rates charged for cer-
tain legal services. Their objective was to establish a legal clinic
providing low-cost legal services by handling a high volume of
routine legal matters. They felt it was necessary to advertise in
order to attract the volume of business necessary to enable
them to offer legal services at a reduced cost.' Disciplinary
proceedings were instituted against Bates and O'Steen by the
president of the Arizona State Bar, charging them with a viola-
tion of Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (B).1 The petitioners conceded
that their advertisement violated DR 2-101 (B), but argued
that such an absolute prohibition on advertising violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act"0 and the first amendment." Reviewing
the finding of the administrative committee of the Arizona
State Bar that the advertisement violated DR 2-101 (B), the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld the findings of the local com-
mittee and rejected petitioner's challenges to the rule. On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four deci-
sion, reversed, holding that the ban on advertising contravened
the first amendment.
The Court limited its holding in Bates to a determination
that the state and the bar could not regulate the right of law-
yers to advertise the prices charged for routine legal services.2
7Id.
'Id. at 354.
Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (B), ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILIrY (herein-
after cited as DR), later amended to accord with Bates, provided in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display adver-
tisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
' 433 U.S. at 356.
, Id.
,2 Id. at 384.
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Thus, Bates did not invalidate all restrictions imposed by the
bar on attorney advertising, but merely allowed advertisement
of routine legal services,'3 while recognizing the continued abil-
ity of the state and the bar to regulate "false, deceptive or
misleading" advertising. 4
The Bates Court expressly reserved the issue of the permis-
sible scope of state regulation of in-person solicitation of a
client.' 5 The Court dealt with this issue in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association,6 where an attorney, through direct, in-
person communication, solicited two young women as clients.
The clients were approached shortly after their involvement in
an automobile accident, one while still in the hospital room in
traction, and the other within one day after her release from the
hospital. At the time of the solicitation, therefore, both young
women were weakened, upset, and vulnerable to deceptive ad-
vertising techniques. After a complaint was filed by the
women, the County Bar Association filed a formal complaint.'7
Subsequent to the required hearing, the state administrative
body found that the appellant had violated DR 2-103 (A)'" and
DR 2-104 (A)'9 of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Board,
and rejected Ohralik's first amendment claim.
' Id. at 383.
Id.
15 In addition to regulation of in-person solicitation, the Court was not hesitant
to observe that the bar should be allowed to regulate ad claims relating to the quality
of services. This restriction is based on the notion that such claims are not susceptible
to verification, or measurement.
" 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978).
" Id. at 1924.
" DR 2-103 (A) provided: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment as a pri-
vate practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer."
19 DR 2-104 (A) provided in relevant part:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain
counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice, except that: (1) a lawyer may accept employment by a close friend,
relative, former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment),
or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
The Ohio Supreme Court promulgated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity modeled on the same numbered rules as the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility. Both codes have since been amended to reflect certain
changes brought about as a result of Bates.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with Ohralik's contention
that his solicitation was constitutionally indistinguishable
from the advertisement in Bates. The Court held that "in-
person solicitation of professional employment by a lawyer does
not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the availa-
bility and terms of routine legal services .... "20 Applying the
Virginia Board balancing test, the Court noted that the inform-
ative aspects of in-person solicitation, advising the prospective
client as to the availability and terms of proposed legal ser-
vices, were similar in function and constitutional privilege to
other methods of solicitation. However, in-person solicitation
is a one-sided presentation in which the solicitor may exert
pressure or demand that a prospective client make an immedi-
ate decision without the benefit of a comparison or reflection.
In short, in-person solicitation is inherently conducive to types
of attorney misconduct which may be validly prohibited by the
state."2
The Court found that there was no constitutional require-
ment that overreaching be demonstrated in a specific case as
a prerequisite to proscribing the solicitation in question. The
state possessed a valid interest in eliminating the possibility of
overreaching,2 and was not required to demonstrate that this
possibility had actually accrued before disciplining the appel-
lant.2
B. The Impact of Bates in Kentucky
The precise limits of Bates and a clear definition of "in-
person solicitation for profit" await further Supreme Court
clarification in future disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless,
Bates appears certain to have a very decisive impact on attor-
ney advertising in Kentucky, especially in view of the new
Kentucky rule on television advertising and the broad interpre-
tation given Bates by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Prior to the Bates decision, the American Bar Association
organized the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising4 which, after
" 98 S. Ct. at 1918.
21 Id. at 1923.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 1924.
24 The Task Force was established by the ABA Board of Governors on June 7,1977.
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
careful deliberation, prepared alternative drafts of Canon 2.
Two proposals, labeled "Proposal A" and "Proposal B," were
submitted by the Task Force. While "Proposal A" was de-
scribed by the Task Force as being "regulatory," because it
authorized certain forms of advertising, "Proposal B" was
termed "directive," because it prohibited only false, fraudu-
lent, misleading or deceptive advertising and subjected viola-
tors to "after-the-fact" discipline. 5 Although "Proposal A" was
adopted as the official position of the House of Delegates,28
both proposals were circulated to state courts and state regula-
tory agencies upon the recommendation of the Board of Gover-
nors.Y
Even after Canon 2 was revised to reflect Bates, Kentucky
continued to recognize the previous American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility as authority, except for any
inconsistency between the unrevised Canon 2 and Bates, 21 and
excluding the area of television advertising. While revised
Canon 2 provides for advertising in print media or on radio,2
it does not expressly authorize television advertising. Instead,
advertising by means other than that provided in DR 2-101 (B)
is permitted at the discretion of the appropriate state agency
upon application by an attorney." The Kentucky Supreme
Court has eliminated the need for such an application by the
promulgation of Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.135, which per-
mits television advertising with certain restrictions.'
2For comments and drafts of both proposals see 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (U.S. Gen. L. Aug.
23, 1977).
28 "Proposal A" was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at their annual
meeting held in Chicago on August 10, 1977.
2 For comparison of the alternative proposals see Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar
of Arizona: From the Court to the Bar to the Consumer, 9 Loy. Cm. L.J. 477, 496
(1978); Attorney Advertising: Bates' Impact on Regulation, 29 S.C. L. Rv. 457, 503
(1978).
RuLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 3.130 (hereinafter cited as SCR).
DR 2-101 (B).
DR 2-101 (C).
" SCR 3.135 provides that:
An individual attorney or law firm may advertise its services as author-
ized by this Rule 3.135, and not otherwise. Such advertisement shall be
confined to the name or names of the attorneys, address, telephone number,
office hours, a statement of the type of services rendered, and a schedule of
customary fees. It may be printed in a regularly published newspaper, maga-
zine, directory, or similar publication or may be read by an unidentified
person on radio or television. (emphasis added).
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During the past term, the Kentucky Supreme Court was
confronted with its first professional solicitation case since the
decision in Bates. In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart,32 the
Kentucky Bar Association charged that two attorneys violated
DR 2-103 (A) by mailing certain letters advertising the avail-
ability and costs of legal services related to real estate trans-
actions to two real estate agencies.3 The Court held that ad-
vertising by attorneys is constitutionally protected except
when the state interest in prohibition outweighs societal in-
terests in free speech .3  The Court distinguished the conduct
in Stuart from the in-person solicitation of Ohralik by observ-
ing that solicitation by letter is not inherently conducive to
overreaching or deceptive practices on the part of an unscrupu-
lous attorney.
II. ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
A. Non-professional Misconduct
Until January 1, 1978,38 SCR 3.320 required that lawyers
convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty
or stealing be automatically disbarred or suspended.37 Accord-
ingly, in Kentucky Bar Association v. Rinehart,3 tle respon-
dent was disbarred after he was convicted of knowingly making
and subscribing a false income tax return for calendar year
1971. 31 Rinehart had reported taxable income of $32,201.91
A lawyer who advertises a fee for routine services and accepts the em-
ployment must perform such services for the amount stated, and a statement
to that effect shall be included in every advertisement.
2 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
" The language of DR 2-103 (A) is contained in note 18, supra.
31 568 S.W.2d at 934.
35 Id.
3' Since January 1, 1978, lawyers convicted of a felony or a class "A" misdemeanor
are no longer automatically suspended. SCR 3.165 now provides that the Court may
temporarily suspend an attorney after conviction if the Court believes that the convic-
tion gravely impugns the continued moral fitness of the convicted attorney for the
practice of law.
SCR 3.320, as amended, provides: "When any member of the Association has
been convicted of a felony or class A misdemeanor a copy of the judgment shall be filed
with the Director for action under Rule 3.160. The Director shall submit copes of the
judgment to the Tribunal who may take action under Rule 3.165."
SCR 3.165 allows for the temporary probation or suspension of an attorney who
comes within the scope of SCR 3.320.
558 S.W.2d 611 (Ky. 1977).
, The charge constituted a violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206 (1) (1976).
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even though he knew that his income was actually $83,719.45.
Attorney M.C. Clem, Jr. was similarly disbarred4 pursuant to
SCR 3.320 after pleading guilty to a charge of theft by decep-
tion subsequent to a previously incurred two-year suspension
from the practice of law.
41
B. Commingling of Funds
Because of the appearance of impropriety and the poten-
tiality of wrongdoing, the Kentucky Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally been quite stringent in the area of disciplinary charges
involving commingling of an attorney's funds with those of a
client.42 If the Court finds that the client's funds have been
wrongfully appropriated for the attorney's own use, it has con-
sistently held that such conduct warrants termination of an
attorney's right to practice law in the State of Kentucky. "The
Court reinforced this traditional attitude during its 1977-1978
term by disbarring two attorneys for commingling funds.
In the first case, Kentucky Bar Association v. Grogan," the
attorney, representing a client in a real estate closing, had
appropriated for his own use funds intended to satisfy an out-
standing mortgage on the property being conveyed. Although
the attorney eventually paid the outstanding balance on the
loan after foreclosure proceedings had commenced, and cooper-
ated with the Kentucky Bar Association in processing his case,
the Supreme Court, unsympathetic to Grogan's plea for leni-
ency, disbarred him from the further practice of law.' 5
Commingling of funds again resulted in disbarment in
<' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem, 561 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1978).
" See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem, 554 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1977).
42 Commingling of funds is violative of ET cAL CONSmIMTIONS 9-5, AumUcAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (hereinafter cited as EC) which
provides: "Separation of funds of a client from those of his lawyer not only serves to
protect the client but also avoids even the appearance of impropriety, and therefore
commingling of such funds should be avoided."
One believed to be misappropriating funds, or other improper use, may be tempo-
rarily placed on probation or suspended in conformity with SCR 3.165 supra, note 37.
41 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Friedlander, 536 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1976); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Tucker, 535 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1975); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Collis, 535
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1975).
" 554 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1977).
41 Id. at 82.
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Kentucky Bar Association v. Wilson"6 when the attorney, after
receiving a check payable jointly to the attorney and a client
as a settlement in a personal injury case, failed to properly
account for the funds between June 29, 1976 and November 13,
1976. The Court found that the respondent either forged the
endorsement on the check or caused it to be forged, commin-
gled and failed to account properly for the funds, and repre-
sented to the client that no check had been received.' 7 For his
misconduct, Wilson was permanently disbarred.
The Supreme Court has also been called upon to deter-
mine whether certain deductions from a client's escrow funds
by an attorney constituted "unethical and unprofessional con-
duct calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute."' ,
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Graves,"9 the Court reluctantly
affirmed a mere censure of an attorney for his improper charges
to a client's escrow account established for the purposes of
covering the necessary costs and expenses in the prosecution of
workmen's compensation and personal injury claims. Included
in the improper billings to the account were expenses for a law
clerk's investigation and research, secretarial and bookkeeping
expenses, and reimbursement for meals. Adding insult to in-
jury, the attorney charged the escrow account for dinner with
a doctor at the New Orleans House in Louisville, which Graves
used to obtain a referral to an orthopedic surgeon m
In proceedings before the Court, Mr. Graves presented
facts not previously brought to the attention of the Court." In
" 555 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1977).
, Id. at 953.
' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Graves, 556 S.W.2d 890, 890 (Ky. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 891.
" Graves argues that the Churches [the clients who had deposited
$1,000 in the escrow account] employed him shortly before the statute of
limitations would have barred their claims. He insists that this "necessitated
his representation of their clients, engaging of extraordinary secretarial help,
investigators, engineers, etc., far, far beyond the usual, ordinary attorney
client agreement." He states "he has no employees of his own and has his
secretarial and legal research/investigatory work done by private contrac-
tors." Graves also contends that he has strictly complied with the terms of
the agreement. He has kept his billing to a minimum by eating in "greasy
spoon" and fast food restaurants.
Id. at 891-92.
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light of these facts, the Court adopted the recommendation of
the Board of Governors to publicly reprimand Graves. How-
ever, the Court pointed out that future violators of the rule
against such improper charges could expect more severe pun-
ishment."
C. Repeated Professional Misconduct
The Court was also faced with two repeat offenders, both
of whom were before the Court for the second time on charges
of neglecting the affairs of their clients. In both cases the Court
determined that the customary public reprimand was an insuf-
ficient sanction, instead imposing determinate suspensions
from the bar on both attorneys.
Two cases before the Court involved D. Gene Dillman, who
had previously been disciplined by the Court for case neglect. 3
In his second appearance before the Court for disciplinary pro-
ceedings, Dillman was suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year for his failure to, competently represent a
client in a workmen's compensation claim, and for false and
deceptive statements made to that client. After a third ap-
pearance for similar dishonest and incompetent conduct, Dill-
man was disbarred from the practice of law.5
Gary L. Littleton, another repeat offender, was twice sus-
pended from the practice of law for a period of two years. The
first suspension occurred after a client's personal injury case,
pending for nearly five years, was dismissed for failure to prose-
cute.55 The second action against Littleton resulted from his
failure to file a workmen's compensation claim for his client.
The two sanctions were to run concurrently.5 7
Case neglect was also demonstrated in Kentucky Bar As-
sociation v. Martin,8 resulting in the suspension of Lohren F.
52 556 S.W.2d at 892-93.
5Dillman had previously been brought before the Court for unethical and unpro-
fessional conduct in 1976. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky.
1976).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 554 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1977).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 562 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1978).
" Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Littleton, 560 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1977).
17 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Littleton, 561 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1978).
- 558 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1977).
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Martin, Jr. from the practice of law for two years for his failure
to represent adequately a client in a civil suit against the City
of Somerset. Martin's client had been arrested in Somerset for
disturbing the peace; the charge was later dismissed. Aggrieved
by his detention incommunicado from the time of his arrest
until trial, and because he allegedly had been refused permis-
sion to take medication for a heart condition, the client sought
legal assistance from Martin. Testimony indicated that the
suit had never been filed on behalf of the client, yet the client
was informed that suit had been filed in federal district court
at London, Kentucky. After the client discovered that suit had
not been filed at London, he was informed by Martin that suit
had been filed in Lexington. In truth, however, no suit had
been filed at all. Upon consulting another attorney concerning
the matter, the client discovered that it was too late for suit to
be brought against the city.
The Court found gross neglect of a client's affairs in the
case of M.C. Clem, Jr. 9 Charges against Clem resulted from his
representation of three clients in separate pieces of litigation.
The first client had employed Clem to handle a workmen's
compensation claim. During the course of the action, Clem
failed to meet appointments with his client and to appear at
depositions. After the Workmen's Compensation Board found
against his client, he falsely informed the client that an appeal
had been filed. In addition, Clem refused to turn over the case
file to another attorney at the request of the client."
The second charge arose out of the representation of a wife
in a divorce action in which Clem did not attempt to discover
the assets of the husband. Although Clem later advised the
wife to appeal a judgment distributing the property, he failed
both to execute the necessary bond for appeal and to file a
brief. Failure to file the bond led to the dismissal of the appeal,
but Clem did not inform the client of the dismissal.' Finally,
the client learned of Clem's neglect when public notice of a
court ordered sale of some of the client's property appeared in
a local newspaper. When confronted with this notice, Clem
1, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem, 554 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1977).
Id. at 360.
" Id. at 361.
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falsely informed his client that he knew nothing about it, but
that he would appear at the sale to represent her. Not one to
break a pattern, Clem failed to appear at the sale.2
Clem's third client was a husband in a divorce proceeding
who was advised that he would receive one-half of the furniture
and title to a camper. Contrary to his understanding with the
client, Clem drafted a property settlement agreement whereby
all furniture was given to the wife and the wife was to be paid
one-half the value of the camper. Clem also erroneously in-
formed his client that the wife could not withdraw funds from
a savings account because she was prohibited from so doing by
an injunction. The wife did in fact withdraw one-half of the
amount in the savings account, and Clem took no action to
protect his client's interest. 3
Rejecting the recommendation of the Board of Bar Gover-
nors for disbarment, the Court suspended Clem for two years.
Nevertheless, the Court recognized the reprehensible nature of
the conduct and gave notice that any attorney henceforth en-
gaging in similar conduct would be disbarred. 4
D. Canon Seven
Two cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court in the
1977-1978 term concerned violations of Canon Seven's dictate
to zealously represent a client within the bounds of the law and
illustrated the necessity for regulating attorney conduct during
legal representation. The first case, Kentucky Bar Association
v. Shane,65 involved a violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A)
providing, in effect, that a lawyer is not to communicate with
an opposing party represented by counsel unless the lawyer has
opposing counsel's consent."6 Shane, although not a member of
the Kentucky Bar Association, entered his name as co-counsel
62 Id.
s Id.
64 Id.
65 553 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1977).
" DR 7-104 provides in part that:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject
of representation with a party he knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
[Vol. 67
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for the defendant in a civil action filed in northern Kentucky.
During the course of the action, Shane sent a letter to the
plaintiff and forwarded a copy to the plaintiff's attorney. Res-
pondent admitted the violation and received a public repri-
mand."
The second case, Kentucky Bar Association v. LaBach,6
arose out of an ongoing dispute between LaBach and another
attorney, David C. Graves,69 which had begun while LaBach
was employed by Graves. There were three charges filed
against LaBach: first, that LaBach had removed work product
from Graves' office without permission; second, that LaBach
had "pirated" clients from Graves; and finally, that LaBach
had made false and improper statements about Graves in a
motion filed before a public agency.
Only the third charge of making a false and improper
statement warranted action by the Court. The statement was
made in LaBach's response to a motion by Graves for payment
of attorney's fees in a case in which LaBach had replaced
Graves as the attorney of record. LaBach effectively stated that
as a result of Graves' withdrawal from the case a complaint had
been filed against Graves for "defrauding and misrepresenting
his clients." The Court found that the statement did not vio-
late then existing Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.150,70 which
prohibited public disclosure of disciplinary proceedings unless
ordered by the Court, but that the statement did violate Disci-
plinary Rule 7-102 (A)(1), which prohibited the lawyer from
taking action on behalf of his client when such action would
serve merely to injure or harass another.71 Accordingly, LaBach
was sternly reprimanded for his conduct.
"Even though Shane was not a member of the Kentucky Bar Association, the
court held that he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court when practicing law in
Kentucky. Shane had previously been disciplined by the Cincinnati Bar Association
for the same conduct involved here. He unsuccessfully argued that the Kentucky
discipline could be no more severe than the Ohio punishment.
u 564 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1978).
" Graves' conduct was also brought into question in an unrelated case. See Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Graves, 556 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1977).
' Now SCR 3.150.
" 564 S.W.2d at 12-13.
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II. NON-DISCIPLINARY CASES
A. Political Contributions
Occasionally, state law prohibits an act which seems to be
inherent in an attorney's rights and duties under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus creating an apparent conflict.
Such a conflict faced the court of appeals in Kentucky Regis-
try of Election Finance v. Louisville Bar Association.7 2 The
appellee, an incorporated bar association, requested an opinion
on the legality of proposed newspaper ads publishing the result
of a poll of lawyers concerning the qualifications of candidates
for judicial office in the 1977 primary in Jefferson County. Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes § 121.025 and Section 150 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution both make unlawful any direct or indirect
contribution by a corporation toward the nomination or elec-
tion of any state officer. It was the opinion of the Registry of
Election Finance that publication of the poll in the newspaper
would be unlawful, but that the law would permit dissemina-
tion of the results through another news media. 3 In a declara-
tory judgment action brought by the Registry, the trial court
ruled that the bar associations could publish the poll since the
association did not come within the view of the statute .7 On
appeal, the court of appeals held that the prohibition was abso-
lute and extended to all corporations, including bar associa-
tions.
The court recognized that Canon Eight of the Code of
Professional Responsibility places upon the lawyer a responsi-
bility for aiding in the selection of qualified candidates for
judicial or administrative office.75 While this duty does not
require the endorsement of a particular candidate for judicial
office, the attorney may and should make public appraisals in
a proper and dignified manner because of an attorney's alleged
72 No. CA-1571-MR (Ky. Ct. App. April 7, 1978).
73 Kentucky Registry of Election Finance v. Louisville Bar Ass'n No. CA-1571-
MR, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. April 7, 1978).
7 Id.
15 EC 8-6 provides in part: "Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal observa-
tion or investigation, to evaluate the qualification of persons seeking or being consid-
ered for such public offices, and for this reason they have a special responsibility to
aid in the selection of only those who are qualified. .. ."
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ability to appraise the qualifications of candidates." The court
resolved any potential conflict between the state law and
Canon Eight by interpreting the phrase "proper and dignified
manner," as used in Canon Eight, to mean that only publica-
tion in a lawful manner was permitted by the Canon. Thus, any
newspaper and advertisement publishing the results of the poll
was unethical under Canon Eight as well as illegal.
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Even though it is unlawful for incorporated bar associa-
tions themselves to publish their appraisals, appropriate infor-
mation can be disseminated in other ways. For example, to
avoid the situation presented in this case, the court suggested
that the public could be legally informed of the poll results by
a committee established by the incorporated bar association for
the express purpose of advising the electorate.
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B. Judicial Retirement and Removal
In an effort to regulate the conduct of persons charged with
the administration of justice, the Kentucky General Assembly
in 1978 proposed the revision of Section 121 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which provides for the retirement or suspension
of judges sitting on the Supreme Court, court of appeals, circuit
court or district court. The amendment was ratified by the
voters in November 1975, and became effective on January 1,
1976.
Pursuant to revised Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court promulgated procedural rules to effec-
tuate the purposes of the amendment.71 The constitutional va-
lidity of these rules was challenged in Nicholson v. Judicial
Retirement and Removal Commission,'" where the appellant,
a judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court, received a public censure
under SCR 4.0101 for his "inept" handling of a criminal pro-
" See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 189 (1938).
" No. CA-1571-MR, slip op. at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. April 7, 1978).
's Id.
" See SCR 4.000 for removal procedure.
s 562 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1978).
S 5CR 4.020 provides that:
(1) The retirement and removal commission shall have power after notice
and hearing herein provided:
(a) To order a temporary or permenent retirement of any judge of
the Court of Justice whom it finds to be suffering from a mental or
1978-79]
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ceeding. The censure was challenged on three grounds. First,
Nicholson claimed that since the alleged misconduct occurred
subsequent to the constitutional amendment but prior to the
adoption of the rule, only the amendment indicated which
forms of conduct were proscribed. Since the amendment itself
did not specifically proscribe Nicholson's conduct, he argued
that disciplinary action under the general wording of the
amendment violated his right to due process." Similarly, Ni-
cholson argued that the censure was violative of state and fed-
eral constitutional "ex post facto" prohibitions. Rejecting both
arguments, the Court noted that the "ex post facto" prohibi-
tion applied only to criminal matter, not to laws regulating the
conduct of judges by civil, non-punitive means. The due pro-
cess argument was also rejected, because notice of the reviewa-
bility of judicial conduct had previously existed, and because
the standards set out in the amendments were sufficiently spe-
cific.8
3
Nicholson found a second violation of his due process
rights in the combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions within the Judicial and Retirement Commission, a
combination which Nicholson argued had created a biased trier
of fact. In effect, he argued that the Commission members were
so influenced by their involvement in the investigation that
physical disability that seriously interferes with the performance
of his duties.
(b) To issue a private reprimand or public censure or to suspend
without pay or remove or retire any judge of the court of justice
whom it finds to be guilty of any one or more of the following:
(i) Misconduct in office.
(ii) Persistent failure to perform his duties.
(iii) Incompetence.
(iv) Habitual intemperance.
(v) Violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.300.
(vi) Any willful refusal or persistent failure to conform to official
policies and directives adopted by the Supreme Court and issued
by the Chief Justice in his constitutional capacity as chief execu-
tive officer of the Court of Justice.
(c) To remove a judge whom it finds to lack the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for the judgeship in question.
(d) An erroneous decision made in good faith shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
12 562 S.W.2d at 308.
'A Id.
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they could not remain impartial at the adjudicative proceed-
ings. However, the Court held that Nicholson had failed to
overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity of the
members of the Commission, and thus dismissed his second
challenge to the rules.1
4
Finally, Nicholson argued that the Commission exceeded
its authority by issuing a censure, a remedy not expressly al-
lowed by the state constitution. Section 121 expressly provides
the following sanctions for judicial misconduct: (1) retirement
for disability; (2) suspension without pay; (3) removal for
cause. Appellant contended that a lesser sanction could not be
imposed. Nevertheless, relying on a similar provision of the
New York State Constitution and on their own experience and
reasoning, the Court held that the lesser power of sanction is
implicit in the greater, express powers to retire, suspend or
remove. Therefore, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the rules and remanded the case for determination of whether
the conduct was protected from disciplinary redress by SCR
4.020(d), which prohibits action by the Commission based on
erroneous decisions made in good faith."
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court has decisively demon-
strated that it is no longer willing to tolerate unprofessional
and unethical conduct such as that exhibited by many of the
attorneys before the Court for disciplinary action in the 1977-
1978 term. Not only are the sanctions imposed more severe
than in previous years, but in addition the Court has warned
that future cases of similar conduct will warrant even harsher
penalties. In both Graves and Clem, the Court warned that
future cases of similar misconduct by any attorney could very
probably result in disbarment.
Those who wish to solicit legal business must be aware of
the limitations of Bates, Stuart, and the Revised Canon 2.
Although the decisions and recent revised Court rules are indic-
ative of a more liberal attitude toward advertising, one extend-
ing solicitation beyond the uncertain bounds of the rules must
" Id. at 309.
5 Id. at 310.
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suffer the consequences, as did the appellant in Ohralik. While
both the. United States Supreme Court and the Kentucky Su-
preme Court have invalidated the absolute ban on advertising,
in-person solicitation remains impermissible. The controlling
factor in determining the parameters of first amendment pro-
tection seems to be the relationship of regulation to the goal of
protecting the consumer from fraudulent and deceitful actions
on the part of unscrupulous attorneys. The issue remaining for
Kentucky attorneys, even after Stuart, is when does the need
for such consumer protection outweigh the value of the free
flow of commercial information in the legal setting.
Whitney Wallingford
